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Problems and Prospects of Arms Transfer Limitations Among Second-Tier
Supplier~: The Cases of France, The United Kingdom, and the Federal
Republic of Germany*

INTRODUCTION
The question of controlling the arms trade to the Third World

is

complicated by the quantity and hierarchy of suppliers, the mix of motives in
selling and buying armaments, and the variety of restrictions one could seek
to apply.

Aside from their sales to industrialized states, Britain, France,

and West Germany, the so-called "second tier" suppliers, compete and sometimes
cooperate for a niche in a recently shrinking Third World market.

In the

process they contend with first-tier, i.e., superpower suppliers, and with the
emergent third-ti er of Thi rd World arms manufacturers and exporters.

It has

been estimated that a third of the Third World arms market is "locked up" by
the US and USSR;

the other suppliers vie for the

remaining customers,

especially the few who can absorb and afford sophisticated equipment.!
As· a group, though, European exporters recently have outstripped the
superpowers in Third World arms sales, with 31 % of the market in 1985.2 Thus,
despite hard economic times, second-ti er suppliers have captured a larger
share of the Third World market, based mainly on Middle Eastern sales.

Heavy

supplier competition and the resultant "buyers' market" of recent years tend
to worsen the prospect for future sales on the one hand, but the proliferation
of civil and international violence in the Third World, the prominence of the
military

in Third World governments,

and

the continued .availability of

financing, in one form or another, for arms acquisition tend, despite mounting
international debts, to buoy the market and encourage exporters.3
Second-tier suppliers

also are strongly affected

by the prevailing
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climate

of superpower agreement or disagr~ement on international arms control

questions.

British, French and German leaders found it convenient to put off

confronting the question of stri ~gent 1imits on Thi rd World arms transfers
while the superpowers haggled over the terms of the Conventional Arms Transfer
(CAT) talks during the late 1970s.

If Washington and Moscow had been able to

agree on principles of restraint in various regions,

however,

and were

prepared to enforce them jointly, it would have been very difficult for
London, Paris and Bonn to continue business as usual in those regions.
same

token,

to

speak

of anything

beyond

the most minimal

By the

second-tier

restraints without including at least one superpower and arms purchasers in a
larger international agreement is probably fanciful.4
It is commonly agreed that second-tier exporters dispatch arms and related
military equipment to the Third World for both economic and military/strategic
reasons, i.e., to sustain domestic military production and employment, improve
trade

balances,

retain

at

least

somewhat

autonomous

arms manufacturing

capabilities, and curry favor with influential Third World regimes.5

Although

such benefits, appear to be over-rated, any agreements to limit arms exports
must provide alternative ways of satisfying these interests, or be part of a
redefi ni ti on of such interests i nvo 1vi ng, for ex amp 1e, economic reconversion
or changed security doctrines.
In addition, while it is convenient to speak generally of "restraints" or
"limitations" on the arms trade, a wide variety of limits are conceivable,
•
each with varying likely consequences for international economics or security.
Clearly some arms trade controls would result in a diminished flow to the
Third World, while others merely would underwrite, identify, or regulate the
continued or even increased flow of weapons.6

Each of these forms of control

would have certain consequences for supplier and recipient states, only some
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of which might be deemed beneficial, depending on

the criteria

for arms

control success employed, e.g., reducing war frequency or damage, enhancing
deterrence or predictability, reducing defense budgets, international tension
or militarism.
As noted by Taylor, twin issues of political feasibilty and desirability
complicate the prospect for export control, including that by second-tier
suppliers.

Deep cuts in Third World arms supplies might reduce the scale of

Thi rd World warfare, but might not reduce the frequency of war nor increase
spending

on

economic

development.7

inherent right of national

Since

the

UN

Charter

recognizes

an

"self-defense," controls which build-in regional

force balances would be more feasible, but al so might not reduce warfare
without

measures

to

settle

disputes.a

Qualitative

restrictions

on

hign

technology weapons exports could result in more money being spent on less
costly and advanced conventional annaments (e.g., automatic rifles, rockets and
tanks) which, as Lebanon and the Gulf wars have shown~ ultimately could kill
more people than a few expensive and .sophisticated fighter planes.

In short,

any imposition of or agreement on export controls must be viewed in tenns of
its security consequences. 9
In this chapter the record of British, French, and West German attitudes
regarding anns export limitations will . be reviewed in an effort to identify
the types of controls most feasible and desirable from the viewpoint of or in
re)ation to second-tier suppliers.

These states, of course, display a variety

of opinion on these matters, both in contrasting foreign policies and among
di verse domestic interest groups.

Therefore, we shall pay attention to the

differences as well as common interests among second-tier suppliers, and to
domestic

forces

comprehensive.

which

make

anns

trade

controls more

or less

likely

We shall deal both with existing and potential controls.

or

4

GENERAL PERSPECTIVES OF SECOND-TIER SUPPLIERS
Arms transfer controls could stem from concerns about both national
welfare and security, as well as about morality and peace.10

In terms of

welfare and national prosperity, arms manufacturers and government officials
conceivably could become disillusioned about the viability of the Third World
weapons market, especially given increasing Third World debt and demands for
"offset" or "counter-trade."

In addition, changed market conditions, such as

expanded US, NATO, or European Community (EC) procurement of British, German,
or French anns, and easier availability of oil and other natural resources
could obviate the need for and interest in Third World sales.

On the other

hand increased standardization qf systems in NATO, and continued American
dominance

of

NATO

the

market

might

increase · the

perceived

need

for

compensatory European exports to the Third World or compensatory US subsidies
to Europe.

Arms sales in general continue to be regarded as a "quick fix" for

trade imbalances, in spite of the fact that they do 1i ttl e to remedy the
structural causes of those imbalances.11
Economic
hypothetical,

motives
but

for

limiting

second-tier

arms

suppliers

restraints for a number of years.
falling into the "wrong hands."

trade
have

so

far

have

demonstrated

been mainly
real

security

Most of these reflect worries about anns
Embarrassing wartime experiences, such as

German arms cropping up in Algeria for use against the French in the 196Os,
French

and

British

anns

being

used

to

sink

British

warships

in

the

Falklands/Malvinas war, and Iraq's use of French anns to attack oil tankers
bound for West Europe all raise West European concerns about the screening of
arms recipients.

Concerns about better end-use controls al so stem from the

possibility that lethal weapons, acquired by terrorist organizations would be

-

-

-

-- - --- - -
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used against British, French·or German state interests.

Qualitative controls

on weapon transfers to LDCs, including the modification and downgrading of
systems or outright bans on some exports, are 1argely a product of military
concern about the release of sensitive technologies.

Indeed such concern has

proved to be a primary export licensing criterion in the UK, and of at least
some concern in France and West Germany.12
Export restrictions which would result in a sharp decline of second-tier
supplies depend generally on a diminished government and economic stake in
military production, and therefore on a redefinition of national
which downplays weapons production autonomy.

security

The French push for anns exports

began with the view that, along with nuclear weapons, a vital conventional
arms capability would assure French sovereignty in the post-colonial era.
This original aim expanded into a self-sustained economic interest in weapons
production

and

trade.13

The

British

also

have

clun9,

with

increasing

difficulty, to a traditional capability for production in all three weapons
categories: land, sea, and a.ir; and the West Gennans also gradually have
renewed at least partial capabilities in all

three areas.

Therefore, the

influence of and support for "military-industrial complexes" would have to
diminish or be routed in new directions to ease the way for major restrictions
on Third World anns sales.
Second-tier, or mid-sized suppliers have retained selective interests as
well in Third World political influence, and anns transfer controls have been
and increasingly could be related to such interests.

Regional instability and

violence beyond certain limits becomes difficult for mid-sized European powers
to tolerate, especially if the region in question supplies vitally needed
resources.

Concerns about human rights and the level of carnage in civil or

i nternati anal disputes or wars enter here as wel 1.

Yet while one option to
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regulate Third World ~arfare would be to reduce or ban arms shipments to
combatants, and while at one time or another Britain, France, and West Germany
all have articulated i'ntenti ons to do so, other more appealing options al so
exist.

The Iran-Iraq fighting

illustrates European willingness to choose

sides and/or seize the moment to take commercial advantage through continued
or increased arms or spare parts shipments.14
Since
domestic

second-tier
politics

suppliers

pl _a ys

a

generally

role

in

are

parliamentary

limiting

the

arms

democracies,

trade.

However,

traditions of secrecy and governmental privilege surrounding defense matters,
plus the strong. momentum of military-industrial interests make it difficult
for arms trade opponents to gain a share of decision-making on specific sales,
even to the extent possible in the relatively more open US system.

Opponents

are most vocal and effective in the Federal Republic, where they can point to
constitutional and legal provisions limiting West Germany's role in fueling
As a result, Bonn has adopted a more anonymous arms supp 1i er

foreign wars.

role than other second-tier suppliers, relying on co-production and overseas
licensed production arrangements.15
including

a Campaign Against

activists,

together

governmental
military

fears

suspicions

with
about
about

In Britain a combination of interests,

the Arms Trade
political

advanced
arms

by church

parties'

equipment

human

reaching

export commercialism

watchfulness concerning specific sales.

groups
rights

and

concerns,

Soviet allies,
all

peace

and

contribute to

a

Such interests and constraints, while

•

present to an extent, are weakest in France.16
Based
formulated

on

these . general

both · unilateral

perspectives,

and multilateral

second-tier

suppliers

have

positions on the management,

restriction, or reduction of Third World arms transfers.

We shall examine

these separately in order to assess the restraints most 1ikely to be adopted
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in future.

Arms trade management, whether unilateral or multilateral, implies

rules for reporting or licensing sales in specific circumstances, as well as
potential

market

sharing

arrangements.

Restriction

of

sales

entai 1s

disapproval, banning or embargoes to specific states or classes of states or
of specific types of weapons.
measures,

such

as

Reduction of transfers includes more sweeping

qualitative

or

quantitative

limits or ceilings,

and

deliberate government policies or international agreements designed to curtail
weapons

exports.

In

the process of devising

restraints,

there can be

tradeoffs, such as restraints on transferring arms vs. the technology or
equipment to make or use them, on naval, vs. air vs. land systems, or on
.weapons deliveries vs. new sales agreements.
Recent Trends in Second-Tier Arms Supplies
Before delving into unilateral and multilateral British, French, and West
German arms transfer limitations, it would be well to examine these states'
recent record of arms transfers to the Third World.

Periods and locations of

increasing or declining supplies can provide clues about existing or potential
future arms transfer restraints.
As seen in Table 1, and allowing for the inherent uncertainties of arms
transfer data, only France has had consistent major increases of Third World
arms transfers since 1973, although the 'Federal Republic has doubled its share
of major weapons transfers.

Therefore, France would appear to be the most

invested of the three in the Third World arms market.
France's

comparatively

limited

inroads

into

the

This goes along with

NATO market

withdrawal from the operational command structure in t he 1960s.
US estimates, which are

higher than

since

its

According t o

those reported elsewhere, nearly 100

percent of French arms exports lately have been directed at developing
countries.

Of course, Germany also is

linked to France in many joint

TABLE 1

Percentage shares of French, British and West German arms transfers to the Third World, 1973-84a

% of Third World arms imports

France:: deliveries
Agreements
UK deliveries
Agreements
FRG deliveries
Agreements

1973-76

1977-80

6.4
11.0
4.5
4.4
3.1
4.4

8.9
14.3
5.6
6. 1
4.4
4.9

% of major weapon exports onlyb

% of own total arms exports
going to Third World

Third World total

Own total

1981-84

1973-76

1977-80

1981-84

1975-79

1980--84

1980--84

12.9
14.9
5.3
3.0
4.6
3.1

71.1
95 .9
76.0
84.8
86.7
77.8

96.1
98 .9
85 .2
81.3
80.0
88.2

98.1
99. 1
81.8
86.0
87 .3
60.3

10.6

11.1

80 .6

6. 1

4.8

73 .5

1.5

3. 1

61.0

" B,1se<l on calculations in billions of current US dollars . Data include conventional weapons, parts, ammunition, support equipment and services, and other
militarily designed commodities . 'Third World' consists of ACDA 's 'Developing' category . Source : World Military £xpe11di111res and Arms Transfers, 1985 (US
Arms Control an<l Disarmament Agency: Washington, DC, 1985) , table B, p. 45 .
b From SlPRI, World Armaments and Disarmament: S/PRI Yearbook 1985 (Taylor & Francis: London, 1985), table 11.1, p. 346.
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projects stemming from the 1960s and 70s, which may be underr ~por t12d in t he
He st Germa.n Thi rd World totals.

All

three suppliers generally are over 80

percent dependent upon Third World sales, though FRG agreements have declined
in

the

1980s

while

Britain's

have

increased.

Aggregate

figures

can

be

mi sleading, of course, as both British and French sales in recent years have
tended to concentrate among certain states and regions, as seen below, and
most recently France has been more successful in selling to the US.
Peak years for arms transfers varied somewhat for the three suppliers
(Table 2) from 1976-84, with a basically flat or downward trend in the 80s,
except for the resurgence of new French agreements.

France in general had

more frequent sales upsurges than the other two suppliers.
experienced

an

upsurge

aircraft sale -- or oil
Italy) also shared.

in

1985

as

well,

with

the

Of course, Britain

record-breaking

Saudi

barter -- in which West Germany (Switzerland and

Among the factors influencing the periodic declines in

these states I arms transfers have been: reorientations caused by unexpected
changes of Third World regimes (e.g., Iran); declining Third World w_e apon
absorption capacity; the shifting petro-dollar market; Third World debt, trade
and GNP growth difficulites; and increased Third World indigenous production
(though such production is reported to increase imports of arms components as
well).

The impact of such factors is most clearly seen in the 1983 decline of

new agreements,

even with

the

I ran-Iraq

fighting

and

in the wake of the

Falklands/Malvinas war.
As to regional

concentration of sales (Table 3), not surprisingly all

three suppliers are heavily oriented to the Middle East.

Note, though, that

when Italy is included, the second-tier group jointly are the dominant Latin
American suppliers.

It has been argued that recipients of European arms tend

to be either former colonies with which close ties have been maintained, or

•

TABLE 2

Percentages of the value of French, British and WestGerman arms transfers to Third World regions, 1976--85
Near East/South Asia

East Asia/Pacific
1976-79
Fra11ce
% own deliveries
% own agreements
% regional de liveries
% regional agn;ements•

1980-83

1982-85

Sub-Sahara n Africa

Latin Ame rica ·

1976-79

1980-83

1982-85

1976-79

1980-83

1982-85

1976-79

198()-83

2.0
2. 1
1.5
2. 1

2.7
1.9
. 2.7
2.4

1.7
1.8
2.3
2.1

72.0
70.4
7. 1
9.9

80.0
89.5
12.3
15.3

87.9
88.8
14. 1
15.4

13.0
16.7
12.6
21.6

11.2
5.5
14 .6
11.0

. 4.8
6.0
6.4
11.5

12.9
10.9
9 .9
12.0

6.2
3.0
I0.2
7. 1

own de liveries
own agreements
regional deliveries
regional agreements

10.0
4. 1
5.0
2.4

7 .3
15.8
3.6
6.1

7.2
7.3
2.9
4.3

67 .3
89.4
4.4
7. 1

79.4
64.4
5.9
3.5

77.6
85 .5
3.8
7.6

18.0
1.5
11.5
1.1

5.8
5.2
3.7
3.3

3.0
1.4
1.4

4.7
4.9
2.4
3.0

7.5
14.7
. 6.0
10.9

FRG
% own deliveries
% own agreements
% regional deliveries
% regional agreemen ts

5.0
4.3
1·.9
2.3

6.7
22. l
1.8
4.4

9.0
18.2
3.6
2.3

62.3
39.7
3.0
2.9

48. l
52.3
2.0

35 .7
48.9
1.8
0.9

14.5
-,39.9
6.9
27.4

30.2
20.8
l0.4
6.8

51.9
14.3
21.3
3 .0

18.2
16.0
6.9
9.2

15 .0
4.9
6.5
1.9

1982- 85
5.6
3.4
8.7
6.6

UK
%
%
%
%

1.5

1.3

12.2
5.8
5.9
5.8 ·

3.5
18.7
1.7
4.0

• Indicates supplier's pe rcentage of regio nal total.
Source: Grim mett , R . , Trends in Co11ventio11al A rms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier, / 976-/983 (Congressional Research Service , Library of
Congress: Washingto n , DC, May 1984); and Trends in Conveniional Arms Transfers to 1he Th ird World by Majo r Supplier; /978--/985 (May 1986) . Da ta include
the val ue of weapo ns, spare_parts, constructio n , associated se rvices , mil itary assista nce and training programmes.

TABLE 3
Second-Tier Suppliers' Economic Dependence on Arms Exports
Total arms
exports, 1984
(national
sources 2 $ b}

1984 anns exports
as% of conventional
anns production

Anns exports as
percentage of
total exports

Share of world
exports of majot
weapons, 19811985

France

3.8

50

3.9

10. 6

U. K.

2.6

42

2.8

4.7

FR Germany

1.7

20

1.0

4.0

Italy

2.5

70

3.4

3.8

Spain

0.6

45

2.5

1.2

Sweden

0.3

25

1.0

0.2

Source: Brzoska, M. and Ohlson, T., "The Trade in major conventional arms, 11
SIPRI, World Armaments and Disannament: SIPR Yearbook 1986 (Oxford University
Press: Oxford, 1986, p. 336.
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assertive

non-aligned

dependencies.

states

looking

for

an

alternative

to

superpower

While not exactly non-aligned, Latin states have sought to

break away from US dependency status, and were interested in the products in
which European

exporters

have

tended

to

specialize:

light surface ships,

diesel-powered submarines, light strike aircraft and trainers, helicopters and
light armored vehicles - many of which could be produced locally under license
and re-exported.

European suppliers also took advantage of relative US sales

restraint during the Carter years to build up their clientele.17
The French remain the least successful in breaking into new Third World
markets in recent years, al though French weapons still take a comparatively
large share of · the African and Latin markets.
reorganized

and

stepped

regions.18

Even

France's

declined proportionately,
French

economic ·interests

traditional

up

marketing

sales

to

In 1985, Paris launched a

approach

its

former

to

various

African

Third

World

strongholds

have

as a result of South African sanctions, growing
in

Francophone Africa.

Middle

Eastern

sales,

and

the

poverty

of

French troop contingents in Africa partly

obviate the need for much rearmament by France's African: client states, which
of course could not afford or absorb much anyway.

In this way Paris maintains

influence over former colonies, unthreatened by major inroads of other arms
suppliers.19

By contrast,

the presence of British forces

in rich Middle

Eastern client states, such as Oman, has not notably diminished Omani and Gulf
states tendencies to buy British arms and to diversify arms sources as well.
This pattern of second-tier supplier transfers has various ramifications
for Thi rd World arms control prospects.

With British and German transfers

spread somewhat more widely among regions, London and Bonn would be more
affected than France by the prospect of regional arms restraint agreements,
such as that in 1974 at Ayacucho in Latin America (which despite reaffirmation

10

has hardly been implemented).

France would be most affected by any such

agreement in the Middle East, but all
concern.
be

three suppliers would have serious

If the CAT talks were any indication, suppliers are least likely .to

interested

in

restraining

predominate over competitors.

transfers
NATO

to

the

regions

procurement would

in

have

which
to

they

increase

ilTlllensely to divert significant British and German exports from the Third
World, as there remains significant excess production capacity in both states,
particularly in the ship-building industry.
Generally, then, aggregate trends appear to reflect mainly commercial,
defense

procurement

deliveries.

and market cycle

effects

in

slowing

agreements

or

Occasionally a major revolution, such as that in Iran, will wipe

out, or a major war, such as in the South Alantic, open up new export
possibilities.

Slowly

mounting

international

and

domestic

political

pressures, such as those applied in connection with South Africa and Chile,
can have a moderating influence on arms transfers as well.

UNILATERAL LIMITATIONS
As major powers with extensive international interests, the second-tier
long ago established government management of arms exports through licensing,
.

and have restricted or prevented certa'in exports in certain circumstances.
Nevertheless, while export license rules may discourage or disqualify specific
deals, the vast majority of license requests in each state are granted.
While all three states have asserted in principle that arms should not be
dispatched to combatants in warfare or for internal repression, and have at
times refused sales for such reasons, West Germany and Britain appear to
implement restrictions more stringently than France.

In

her quest for

regional influence and trade as an alternative to the two superpowers, France

11

reportedly has promised in specific sales agreements not to interrupt arms or
spare parts supplies even in crises or war.

The relative concentration of

French exports to the Middle East as compared to the UK and FRG may in part
reflect British and German tendencies to look for export markets in regions
suffering somewhat less upheaval, e.g., Latin America and Asia.20
these distinctions should not be carried too far,

However,

especially in light of

Britain's major Saudi agreements of the 1980s, which carried no restrictions
· as to the use or basing mode of Tornado fighters vis-a-vis Israel and Iran.
As

about

the

i ndi scrimi nate rel ease of sop hi sti cated technologies in weapon sales.

For

example,

noted,

second-tier

suppliers

also

are

concerned

since 1978 the West German government requires notification and

approval of weapons' design and blueprint exports, and since 1982 of privately
negotiated
France,

as

which

well

as

purports

government . sponsored
to

scrutinize

multinational

carefully

prospective

co-production.
recipients

of

advanced systems,21 also has led the way in the design of export oriented·
ships, annor and aircraft in which the level of technology can vary or .be .
modified.22
The government's role in arranging credit for Third World anns customers
also is greater in Paris and London than in Bonn.

Private or state (lander)

banks carry the brunt of defense financing in the Federal Republic, although
the Federal Hermes trade credit guarantee agency has quietly underwritten more
· anns exports, especially of ships, than its formal

role would indicate.23

While there is no corresponding · stigma attached to government financing of
weapons sales in France, from 1968-73 Paris tended to discourage Third World
credit purchases in the name of economic development and debt limitation,
especially

-in

former

French

competition with the USSR~ USA,

colonies.

Yet

more

recently,

in

heated

and Britain for sales to relatively large

,

12
defense consumers,

such as Ind i a and Saudi Arabi a, the French government

reportedly has offered financing co_~ siderably below the interest levels agreed
by the CECO states.

Paris al so has sought to market the Mi rage 2000 as a

"loss leader" with generous credit and repayment terms to debt-ridden states
such as Peru.24
Finally, end-use or re-export restrictions are enunciated and applied by
all

three

concerted

states,

but

enforcement

enforcement of
is

thought

second-tier suppliers by identifying

to

the

provisions

endanger
them

as

the

is

rare.

market

"unreliable".

Indeed,

position

of

Britain,

for

example, imposes end-use certification only in certain sales contracts where
danger

of

re-export

is

considered

great.

London

professes

to

rely

on

intelligence infonnation to track down harmful re-exports, and the threat of
future sales bans to discourage them.25

Generally, al though France imposes

re-export restrictions in most sales contracts, Paris poses few obstacles to
purchasers' use of weapons.

An exception was a ban on . Israeli "offensive"

operations following the 1967 war, which was breached in attacks on Lebanon in
1968.

President De Gaulle, responding to growing political

imposed an embargo on Israel
states in 1969.

pressure, then

and, for appearance sake, on Arab frontline

These had extremely limited effects, as Israel essentially

shouldered France aside and became a prime US arms client, thus showing the
limits of second-tier supplier influence.

While the French government labored

from 1967-74 to justify continued arms sales to Arab states which were not
"battlefield" contestants, the embarrassing disclosure of Libyan re-exports of
Mirages to Egypt in 1973 ended al 1 pretense of an effective embargo, and it
was lifted.

Paris subsequently restricted arms sales to Libya itself, but

more ·as a reaction to the latter's African adventures than to Middle Eastern
warfare or unauthorized weapon re-transfers.
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French Restraints
France's
second-tier

unilateral
suppliers,

anns
have

transfer restrictions,

like

been

half-measures,

chracteri zed

compromises for domestic or foreign political

as

effect.

those

of other
often

In addition to the

contorted logic of various Middle Eastern embargoes, Paris has imposed anns
transfer restraints on Indochinese battlefield contestants in the late 1960s,
and at various times on Pakistan, South Africa, Libya, revolutionary Iran,
~Jigeria, and Angola (the latter two during civil wars).

However, at times

Paris also has been willing to sell weapons to many of these same states and
regimes directly or through third parties.

Even when employed, restrictions

have been leaky, as evidenced in Israel's famous seizure of fast patrol boats
from Cherbourg

in · 1969, with

the tacit cooperation of French officials.

French spare parts continued to flow to Israel, as well, during much of its
embargo.

French

restrictions on Libyan

sales

have alternated with sales

offensives, and restrictions have at different moments included controls on
the types of weapons delivered, as well as "temporary and selective embargoes
on anns deliveries or on new contracts," all to little effect in disciplining
the Libyan leadership.26

In the Nigerian civil war, Paris continued selling

arms for a time to the Federal Government, but then switched to allow sales of
French equipment to the Bi afran rebels · evidently to weaken Nigeria vis-a-vis
Francophone Africa.27
Oddly enough, it was partly in the name of better Third World relations
that

Francois

Mitterand's

government

deemphasized

prior

Socialist

Party

critiques of the anns trade and lifted Giscardian restrictions on Libyan sales
in 1981.28
interests

While Giscard had attempted to safeguard French North African
through

such

sanctions,

Mitterand

reasoned

that

Franco-Libyan

relations could be improved through freer arms sales, a rationale that was to
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ring rather hollow during subsequent French military campaigns against Libya
in Chad, a country in which Mitterand also had attempted to use selective arms
supplies and restrictions to various factions to wean them away from Libyan
connections.

Similarly, -three gunboats,

paid for by Iran but withheld by

Gi sea rd after the Irani an revolution, were rel eased to Tehran by President
Mitterand.29
Basically
limiting

arms

the

French

transfers,

continue
vetting

a

unilateral

individual

managerial

prospective

approach

recipients

to
and

deciding when to withhold certain weapons in certain situations to enhance
French interests.
"Looking beyond France's borders, there is no bureaucratic concern
for the impact of French and rival arms suppliers' behavior on
regional and global security or on economic development in the Third
World. The French military industrial complex can hardly look with
equanimity on the prospect of decreased spending on arms by
developing countries. Little or no attention is given to the impact
on local stability of advanced weapon systems introduced into a
region, such as supersonic aircraft in Latin America. Nor is much
concern expressed for the arms races that might be provoked by the
unregulated transfer of arms to a region such as South Asia or the
Middle East where France has furnished arms to most of the principal
rivals in the region at one time or another. 30
11

The French generally shun broad doctrines or policy rules on restricting the
arms trade, and seem to

have enunciated

relatively few concrete dee i si on

criteria.
The largely nationalized French defense sector basica l ly draws government
into the process of promoting and legitimizing arms sales.

While French trade

unions tentatively oppose increased arms sales,31 in the midst of pressure for
employment there has been no basic attack on the forces supporting the arms
trade, i.e., the complex of military-industrial interests and state supported
weapons

research

teams.

Unlike

Britain

and

Germany,

the

issue

of

divers ifi cation or conversion from defense to ci vi 1 production has not been
broached

often

by

the

government,

labor,

or management.

The

Socialists
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flirted with a reorientation in the early 1980s, away from Third World to
European and North American defense markets, but failed to make the foreign
policy changes,

especially

regarding NATO,

which might facilitate such a

shift.
British Restraints
In a decidedly case-by-case oriention to the arms trade the British
government maintains the watchword of "flexibility" in rule application.

The

Defence and Foreign Ministries have generated tables which rank weapon systems
as to technological sensitivity and rank prospective customers as to security
risk or political

acceptability.

These lists are then compared in a · rough

calculus, especially in the early stages of· controversial cases to detennine
appropriate release of technological infonnation.

The Treasury's ratings of

credit-worthiness enter as secondary considerations as wel 1.

Recently, for

• example, credits were denied to NATO ally Turkey, thereby aborting an11s sales·
negotiations.32
Despite these seemingly objective criteria, the rankings can be changed
rather rapidly depending upon political

or economic circumstances.

Export

pressures have resulted in calls for speedier downgrading of weapons' security
restrictions in the biannual review process.

Despite political protest, Chile

quickly was promoted from unacceptable to acceptable status for anns shipments
as an offset to Argentina during and sinci the Falkland/Malvinas war.
has

India

presented problems because of security ti es to the USSR, but Britain

nevertheless has campaigned for and concluded major arms sales to Del hi.

The

i nad·e quacy of these eval ua ti ve ratings in predicting consequences hannful to
British interests was demonstrated during the Falklands fighting,

as the UK

had largely trained and equipped the Argentine navy.
In

add1tion

to effects on British

security (including possi~le arms
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shipments to terrorists) a~d technology, other criteria and factors considered
by the British government in deciding on Third World arms export application~
include questio ns of r egional

stability (an ·111-defined concept), alliance

interests and complications (e.g., potential

conflicts with the US in areas

such as Latin America or the Middle East), delicate negotiations (such as
those for the independence of Belize _in Central America), Commonwealth ties
(heavy pressure was applied to London about South African e~ports), nuclear .
non-proliferation,
interests.

internal

political

repression

abroad

and

economic

The latter two were especially important in the unpopular decision

to continue supplying arms to the oil producing Nigerian government during the
Biafran war.33

Equipment judged useful in domestic repression was denied for

example, to Argentina, Uganda and Chile in the 1970s, and to . Indonesia, Chile
and Sri Lanka in the mid-80s.

However,

equipment capable of use against

domestic populations, such as helicopters and strike aircraft, has gone at
times to both Chile and Indonesia since 1978, and no similar restrictions have
been evident on shipments to India, Malaysia or the Sudan despite domestic
unrest in those countries.34
British regional
embargoes against:

political

interests have led since 1970 to selective

Honduras and Guatemala regarding Belize (1970s); Taiwan

since the diplomatic opening to the PRC; Argentina and Israel since the South
Atlantic

and

Lebanese

fighting

of

the

early

1980s.

In

Israel's

case,

Britain's participation in the joint European Community embargo has continued

•

partly because of a limited Israeli demand for British anns, and because of
interests in the Arab market.
lifted when

Israel

completes

London has indicated that the ban will
its withdrawal

from Lebanon.35

be

Spare parts

shipments for Iran were held-up temporarily during the US hostage dispute, and
weapons have been denied to the PLO;

The UN embargo on South Africa has
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largely been

observed,

although certain

dual-purpose equipment,

such as

transport planes, have gone through under special provisions.
The Gulf war has been the occasion for rethinking British guidelines
about the release of weapons to Third World states at war.

London's approach

has contrasted sharply with the joint UK-US embargo against India and Pakistan
during their 1965 fighting, and may reflect the growing ambivalence of Western
anns suppliers about ending the Gulf war--i.e., which side would be the
preferred victor.
of

11

Early in the conflict, London adopted a rule that exports

lethal 11 anns should be banned to both sides.

Yet the ambiguity of this

categorical definition, together with tempting commercial interests, strategic
concerns,

Iraqi

battlefield reverses

and the question of existing paid

contracts with Iran, brought a refonnulation in 1985:
(1)

(2)
(3)

(4)

We should maintain our consistent refusal to supply any lethal
equipment to either side;
Subject to that overriding consideration, we should attempt to
fulfill existing contracts and obligations;
We should not, in future, approve orders for any defence
equipment which, in our view, would significantly enhance the
capability _of either side to prolong or exacerbate the
conflict;
In the line with this policy, we should continue to scrutinise
rigorously all applications for export licences for the supply
of defence equipment to Iran and Iraq.36

Obviously the criteria of conflict exacerbation and prolongation can be even
more subjective than weapons' lethality :

The British government has afforded

itself more room to maneuver either to allow or disallow specific export
licenses,

especially

as

the

combatants

have

highly

contrasting

force

configurations.37
The British Labour Party has been more responsive than the ruling
Conservatives to interests critical of the anns trade, and Labour's record
both in and out of office has been somewhat more restrictive about anns trade
to the Third World, especially on questions of human rights and domestic

\
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repression.38

Nevertheless, it was a Labour Government which introduced the

Defence Sales Organisation to rationalize and promote UK arms exports in 1966,
following

similar developments

in

the US.

If Labour or the SOP-Liberal

Alliance came to power, it is not entirely clear that the British arms trade
would be curtailed.

Labour's 1983 election manifesto stated:

"We are al armed by the growth of the arms trade. Labour wi 11 1 i mi t
Britain's arms sales abroad and ban the supply of · arms to repressive
regimes such as South Africa, El Salvador, Chile, Argenti-na, and
Turkey. We will not supply arms to countries where the chances of
international aggression or internal repression would be increased.
Labour will ensure that all arms sales are under strict ministerial
control, subject to parliamentary accountability."
Shadow defense spokesman Denzil Davies went on to elaborate in 1985 upon what
he termed a "very difficult subject" for Labour:
11

• • • My
own .view is that the Defence Sales Organisation [since
renamed Defence Export Services Organisation] should be abolished,
but I recognise that there are many countries, especially
Commonwealth countries, that still look to Britain for the purchase
of arms for their defence. Therefore I cannot see the Organisation
being immediately abolished, but I would certainly work towards
getting rid of it. I would also be very concerned to change the
rules to make it much more difficult for us to sell weapons of
destruction abroad • •• I would change ••• to prohibit all sales unless
there is a very good political reason for selling those arms ... 11 39

Mr. Davies also promised protests against military equipment exhibitions,
joint efforts with trade unions to promote defense conversion, more public
notice of arms transfers and destinations, and strict specific criteria about
the supply arms to states abusing human rights.
This would constitute a tightening of British procedures and standards,
particularly in reporting sales and on questions of human rights.

However,

the Labour pronouncements al so resemb 1e the Thatcher government formula ti ans
on

issues

such

as exacerbation

of

II

international

aggression" or domestic

repression.

A great deal of definitional flexibility would remain about what

constitutes

such

abuses,

"weapons of destruction. 11

and

about

"good

political

reasons"

for

selling

Labour's anguish about prospective job lasses in

19
the defense sector is implied as well; during the 1986 parliamentary debates
on the sale of Westlands Helicopter shares, much more was made, on both sides
of the House, of American vs. European ownership, and of the welfare and
preferences of the work force, than of the wisdom or vi abi 1 i ty of continued
military helicopter sales abroad.40
West German Restraints
The Federal Republic is unique among the three suppliers with a legacy of
legal

and

constitutional

prohibitions

against

international peace or promoting offensive war.

actions

threatening

While these legal strictures

seldom have been tested judicially, they make the sale of weapons abroad more
controversial among the attentive general public than in France or Britain.
Furthermore,

despite

the Topsy-like

growth

of German arms industries and

exports si nee the 1950s, there is as yet no formal sales promotion agency in
Bonn corresponding to the British Defence · Export Services Organisation or the
Directorate for International Affairs in the French Defense Ministry.41
Only West Germany

among . the

three main European

arms

producers

has

indulged in blanket restrictions of arms transfers to states outside the
circle

of

threaten.

NATO

and

associated

states,

and

particularly

where

war might

However, the famous "areas of tension" restrictions of the late

1960s and 1970s have

been

somewhat modified under the

Schmidt and Kohl

governments to all ow Thi rd World sales where they can be shown to enhance
"vital" German foreign policy and security interests, among states unlikely to
use the arms in domestic repression, where regional tensions are unlikely to
be increased or Western alliance interests unduly harmed, and with at 1east
the

advice

of

parliamentary

parties.

This

modification,

a

result

of

considerable inter- and intra-party debate, and clearly a move to facilitate
1 ucrati ve sales to economically · and strategically important states such as
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Saudi A~abia, has positioned the Federal Republic much closer to Britain and
France in judging arms transfer requests on a case-by-case basis.

While Bonn

has adopted a rather legalistic approach to arms transfers, _the government in
the past has failed to link its formal

doctrines to well

defined foreign

political, as opposed to defense and economic policy priorities.

Therefore,

it has been argued that with relaxed restrictions, arms exports to the Third
World could come to substitute for a German foreign policy _regarding the Thi rd
World .42
Beginning under Chancellor Schmidt, and continuing under Kohl, however,
Bonn has shown greater interest in using arms for
relations.

influence and improved

Chancel 1 or Kohl has argued that a new genera ti on of 1 eadershi p

means that the FRG is entitled to the full range of policy options available
to major

powers;

subsequently.

a

"security

partnership"

Whether for purely commercial

with

the Saudis was

or partly political

announced
interests,

prior export license denials for Egypt and Malaysia were lifted as well.43
Before its commercial

sales push of the 1970s,

West Germany briefly

experimented with arms transfers for political influence against the German
Democratic

Republic,

especially

in Africa.

The

failure

and

embarrassing

consequences of these efforts, along with the sti 11 smal 1 volume of German
arms production made the enunciation of ·strong export restrictions politically
easy from 1968-71.
sale

of

Arms exports outside NATO were to be discouraged, with the

"war weapons"

prohibited

in

principle,

mentioned in the ~ar Weapons Control Act of 1961.

although

•

only

for

items

"Defense related material,"

a separate category under German law, was allowed to flow to the Third World,
but not to "areas of tension" such as the Middle East.
decided

which

established.

were

areas

of

tension,

although

no

The Foreign Ministry
overall

criteria

were

For instance, Libya was not allowed to import German U-boats,
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although Chile was allowed to do so in the 1970s despite domestic repression
and international disputes.

A secret arrangement with France, since codified

in the revised export regulations of 1982, allowed co-produced weapons to flow
even to strife-torn areas and French clients such as Libya.
Under the "area of tension 11 guidelines, Bonn was quite selective and
strict about where it would ship arms in the Third World.

Most authorized

direct exports were ships and submarines, for the benefit of the depressed
German shipyards.44

Finally, in the late 1970s, sensitivity about terrorism

1ed Bonn to step up "end-use" decumentati on requirements, al though overseas
1 icensed production still allowed for much evasion.

Indeed at one point in

the 1960s Bonn had attempted of requ1 re desposi ts to assure compliance with
end-use stipulations.45
West German debates about the wisdom of proposed exports to Saudi Arabia
and Chile led to the redefinition and loosening of the export regulations by
the Schmidt government in 1982.46

The three conventional po_litical parties

each developed proposals regarding

the new doctrine,

critically appraised the arms export business.

and the Green Party

Because the FRG for so 1 ong

has been sensitive to its weapons being used in warfare among less developed
states, and because unlike France, the FRG still does not manufacture many
more arms than needed for its own armed forces ( as indicated in Column 2 of
Table 4),47 German export restrictions continue and could be increased if
political

embarrassments occur.48

The ruling coalition government appears

split on the appropriate loosening of export restraints, with CDU-FDP factions
favoring some continued restraint, and sti 11 prevailing over CDU-CSU groups
desiring liberalized arms transfers.

Of course, to be meaningful in limiting

Third World access to German weapons, restrictions would have to ~xtend to the
complex

international

channels

for

German

arms

exports,

so

far

an
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unprecedented

occurence.

The

promotions anns sales,

closer

the

FRG

comes

to

and to anns "overproduction,"

overt government

the less chance for

unilateral renewal of tight restrictions.
Witn the decline in OPEC's importance to the German economy, at least in
the short tenn, together with persistent protest by peace and church groups
and by elements of the military worried about release of sensitive technology
and the requirement for German military instructors to be stationed abroad,
there remains some prospect for a deemphasis of Third World military markets.
Germans have 1 ong preferred multi 1 ateral

diplomacy in NATO and the EC, and

would respond to expanded NATO conventi anal

defense markets.

German trade

unions, through a disciplined campaign by their leadership, have accepted the
principle

of defense

re-conversion

far more widely

than. their French

or

British counterparts (defense jobs are not officially a valid criterion for
"vital" i~terests in the 1982 export guidelines), although their participation
on

company

somewhat.
ASEAN

boards

in ."codetermination"

schemes

tempers

their

opposition

Al anned at government authorizations of easier defense exports to

( Association

of

Southeast

Asian)

states,

at

the

preliminary

authorization of export negoti ati ans with Saudi Arabi a, and at helicopter
sales to South Africa, Chile and Iraq,

the Social

Democrats introduced a

parliamentary bill, which was defeated in 1985, once again to ban war weapons
exports

to

the

Third

World

and

to

strengthen

the

Bundestag's

role

in

controlling such exports.49
Arrayed
however,

against

are

a

such

complex

interests
of

finns,

in

cutting

including

Third

most

of

World
the

anns

trade,

major

Gennan

conglomerates, which rely on defense business for at least a part of their
turnover, as well as regional
influential

interest groups, as in Bavaria or the North,

in the older political

parties.

Connections exist between the
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military, Defense Ministry and manufacturers to promote, if not German arms
self-sufficiency, then a significant continuing production capacity.

However,

German defense industries tend to depend less on arms production

as a

percentage of their total business than do the major British and French
manufacturers.

They could

contemplate more

easily

a deemphasis

on

or

reorientation of arms exports; although they also strive to maintain weapons
production capacities - some would say excess capacities.

It is estimated

that only 10,000 out of 240,000 jobs in the defense sector depend directly on
the Third World market,50 and while German trade balances lately have remained
comfortably in surplus, the FRG's unprecedented post-war unemployment levels
would have to drop .considerably before serious tinkering with the defense
export business would be expected, even from an SPD-led government.
In 1984, Foreign Affairs Minister of State Alois Mertes proposed (to
little effect) a coordinated Western arms transfer policy in part to relieve
the stigma and pressures on Germany for trying to sell arms to Saudi Arabi a
and the Middle East.

Thus, the embarrassments long associated with Germany's

arms trade could eventually 1ead to serious attempts at multilateral export
guidelines (to be discussed below).
at

least

partially

can

duck

Currently, however, the Federal Republic

responsibility

for

sales

through

its

low

international profile and multifaceted s·upply arrangements.51
All three second-tier suppli ers have entered the military high-technology
r ace, sometimes against and sometimes alongside the US and . Japan.

However,

profit margins and endangered production lines also could cause a renewed or
at least sustained British, French, and German emphasis on marketing simple
and

lower

cost

weapons.

For

example,

expectations

are

that

the

new

1i ghtwei ght German Puma tank wi 11 be aimed both at the Bundeswehr and the
Third World to compensate for the slow market in main battle tanks.52

As the
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three supP.liers move towards higher weapons techncflogy, limits or restrictions
on arms trade wi 11 move in that di rec ti on as well, and less sophisticated
designs will be marketed more freely.

MULTILATERAL APPROACHES
Of the
potential

second-tier suppliers,

the Federal

Republic has the greatest

interest in coordinated or multilateral limits on the arms trade.

Traditionally

Bonn

multilateral
preference

has

tried

assoc i ations,
as

capabilities,

well.

in

submerge

and

its

a

late

With

especially

to

its

arms

trade

start

aerospace,

diplomacy

and

innocuously

involvements

show

in

reestablishing

in

view

of

in
this

production

possible

surplus

production capacity · and · faltering world . demand for products such as surface
ships,

the

FRG,

international

and

for

agreements

similar
to

reasons

"rationalize"

the
the

UK,

could

sale

of

come

arms

and

to

favor

possibly

apportion market shares.53
Among

the current or historically enacted multilateral

restraints on

Third Wor1d arms trade have peen: the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 regarding
the

Middle

East;

understandings
hypothetical

UN

such

sanctions,
as

that

approaches have

of

embargoes

and

studies;

Ayacucho.

In

addition,

included:· the superpower CAT

and

regional

proposed

talks;

or

supplier

coordination through the EC, NATO or the Western European Union; international
arms trade and procurement registries; and a global consultative arms transfer
committee.
international

None

of

those

enacted

have

made

much

of

a

dent

in

the

arms traffic, but they represent a class of restraints which

could gain favor in future.

In particular, multilateral approaches avoid some

of the problem that unilateral restraints and embargoes historically seem to
have stimulated greater arms traffic from competitive suppliers.
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Perhaps the most effective of supplier agreements was the Tripartite
Declaration among the US, UK, and France to regulate or balance arms shipments
to the contestants in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in order to prevent a
recurrence of the 1948-49 fighting.

The agreement, which lasted until Egypt

broke the Western arms supply monopoly to the region with the Czech/Soviet
arms deal in 1955, also included British, French, and American guarantees of
Middle Eastern states' territorial integrity.

A Near East . Arms Co-ordinating

Committee was formed to keep track of and balance the arms traffic, with a
view to the security needs of states in the region.

This mechanism proved

generally inconvenient for the regional adversaries, and for the suppliers as
well, since the US and UK had by 1953 developed interests in an anti-Communist
Middle Eastern alliance

structure, including most Arab states.

encountered the first Algerian anti-colonial
common interests with Israel.54

France also

struggles -- thus developing

While the US particularly was inclined to

deny large scale arms shipments to Egypt and Israel, and while Britain denied
Cairo supplies during the Suez base dispute of 1953-54 and had little interest
in supplying Israel, France, with a recovering defense industry and with
Washington's blessing, gradually became Israel's largest supplier.

Britain

and the US tried to win other Arab states such as Jordan and Iraq through arms
supplies.
The Declaration thus came to constitute "more of a division of the market
than a limitation on the sale of arms to countries of the region."55

It also

has been criticized for failing to meet three basic criteria of successful
supplier agreements:

(1)

that they be of limited duration and backed by

intensive efforts to settle political disputes driving regional arms races;
(2) that all relevant potential arms suppliers be included; and (3) that
suppliers' regional political objectives not impede the arms supply necessary
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for a military balance acceptable to the conf.licting parties.56
However,

the

agreement also

illustrated major

capability to prevent a regional arms race.

arms

suppliers•

joint

Similarly the 1965 US-UK embargo

of India and Palistan limited regional warfare, although opening the region to
competitive Soviet and Chinese influence.

Such capabilities later were eroded

somewhat by indigenous arms production, the proliferation of major and minor
arms suppliers, the anti-colonial ethic, and worries about . direct major power
confrontation
However,

the

in

the

Third

principle

of

World

(as

supplier

in

upholding

coordination,

security guarantees).
market

sharing,

and

recognition of recipient security needs stands as a precedent for future
~antral efforts.57
Although the United Nations Charter says next to nothing about arms
transfers,

the

Organization

has

indulged

both

in

calls

approaches to the arms trade and for specific embargoes.

for

coordinated

Of the former,

perhaps the best known are a series of proposed resolutions advocat4ng an arms
trade register and a study of conventional disarmament and the arms trade _in
1981.

From the first UN registry proposals in 1965, Britain has been among

the few major powers to lend support.

Subsequently the Federal Republic has

come to favor such measures as well, calling for greater restraint by all arms
suppliers and recipients, but premising agreement on prior arrangements to
prevent the use of force in international disputes.58
In 1970, London made cl ear its wi 11 i ngnes·s to promote control of the arms
trade

especially

through

suppliers and recipients.59

regional

agreements

in

cooperation

with

other

At the Special Session on Disarmament in 1978,

the UK included proposals for conventional arms control in the draft program
submitted with nine other Wes 4ern states, and its proposal for consultations
among major arms suppliers and recipients on the limitation of all types of
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i nternati anal conventi anal anns transfers was adopted in the final document.
Britain stressed the regional approach throughout the 1970s and into the 80s,
and in 1979 offered to participate in supplier-recipient talks once the Latin
American/Caribbean states had agre~d on possible measures of restraint.

In

relation to anti-terrorist concerns, the UK also has promoted a draft UN
convention

to

ban

the

transfer

of

"inhumane"

weapons,

such

as

mines,

promotions,

London

boobytraps, incendiary and plastic fragmentation devices.60
In

rationalizing

its

own

continued

anns

sales

consistently has fallen back on the theme that cutting its five percent share
of

global

arms

exports

si gni fi cant beneficial

without

effects.

multilateral

restraints

would

have

no

The Thatcher government al so has come to

stress the right of self-defense in UN Charter Article 51 as justification for
sales to "friends and allies," blaming the USSR and certain developing states
for opposition to multilateral

discussion of the anns trade.61

In its own

anns transfer reports, however, London remains unwilling to specify agreements
and destinations except by region.62
At least in public pronouncements, the French government has been much
more

skeptical

than

the

British

and

coordinated or multilateral measures.

West

Gennans

about

the

value

of

Linking anns exports to French autonomy

and Third World influence, French leaders were extremely slow in responding to
the UN Security Council I s South African anns embargo of 1963; in 1970 France
wa.s still Pretoria's major supplier.63

In 1968, however, during the height of

his domestic difficulties with the left wing, and while the bulk of French
arms were still going to advanced industrialized states, President De Gaulle
responded positively to Soviet and American calls for regional Third World
arms

limitations,

particularly

in

the

Middle

East.

Paris

stated

its

willingness to examine the causes of arms trade if "in particular cases,
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c;oncerted measures could be decided upon and applied.under a common accord."64
This approach eroded, however, both because the superpowers themselves were
side tracked by events such a Vietnam and the Soviet-Czech intervention, and
because France was tempted to erode superpower arms hegemony in regions such
as Latin America.

The French have come to view arms embargoes and joint

supplier limitations as ineffective, merely spurring recipients' search for
alternate suppliers or development of indigenous production.
Since De Gaulle's time, French leaders have man~uvered to maintain
freedom · of action, but have not entirely closed the door to multilateral
restraints.

At the 1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament, Giscard d'Estaing·

indicated a willingness to cooperate in regional anns limitations provided
they were initiated by regional powers and included all concerned parties.

By

implication, potential purchasers would have to define a satisfactory arms
level.
"Real progress cannot be achieved from outside, through some form of
cartel of producers or by unilateral action. It can be based only
on the joint will of the countries concerned and their agreement on
the aim and scope of a verifiable regional agreement."65
Even before taking office, Francois Mitterand confined his ~riticism of
arms sales mainly to certain morally obj ecti onabl e recipient states, and did
not advocate across-the-board reductions.
appear to depend

Thus, multilateral restraint would

in part on major powers and consumer states mounting

initiatives and forcing France's hand, plus diminished domestic economic,
technical, political and bureaucratic pressure to produce and sell weapons
altogether unlikely short term prospects.66
Western Approaches
Since the second-tier suppliers are NATO and EC members, one might expect
colllllon concern about the potentially destabilizing effects of arms transfers
to important Third World regions, such as the Middle East or Africa.

Yet on
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the whole, except for occasional

consultations between the UK and US, and

Gennan statements apout anns exports and alliance interests, remarkably little
coordinat·· '.)n of NATO arms transfer policies is evident.
carefully to limit "out of area" concerns lest

NATO members continue

the alliance's

endangered by policy disagreements and competing priori ti es.

future

be

Even when, for

instance, the US and France intervened jointly and coordinated policies in
Lebanon, Chad, and Zaire in the late 1970s and early 1980s, their approaches
were decidedly unintegrated, and did not extend to coordinated anns transfer
limits.67
With a strong American initiative in the late 1970s, the prospect for a
coordinated Western approach emerged on the eve of the CAT talks.
administration
consumers

to

intended
extend

to

anns

organize
control

a

conference

discussions

of

to

arms

T.he Carter

suppliers

conventional

and

weapons.

Proceeding with unilaterally announced restraints, Washington applied "moral
suasion"

to

Western

Europe.

The

Administration

promotions by all major suppliers and

sought

reduced

sales

regional anns control agreements, and

developed (unannounced) criteria to evaluate Western Europe's cooperation: (1)
that other suppliers not fill

the gaps left as the US curtailed transfers,

although they could maintain or even increase exports to their own traditional
clients; (2) that other suppliers try to restrict the levels of sophisticated
weapons

technology

released;

and

(3)

that

other

suppliers

Washington before initiating new transfer agreements.68
suasion did not sit well

with allies,

consult with

Naturally, such moral

for reasons of pride, politics and

production.
Publicly, Britain, France and West Germany indicated mild interest and
tentative approval of the initial US proposals, but only if the Soviets could
be involved.

Barring such involvement, and subsequently that of the recipient
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states, Britain and France particularly showed no interest either in solely
Western

supplier restraint.69

As a result,

the CAT

process thereafter

focussed exclusively on the ultimately fruitless US-USSR talks.
Despite
bureaucracy,

considerable

doubt

the

government

French

framework" could be arranged.

about

such

endeavors within

encouraged

them

provided

the

French

a

"global

France's support of regional solutions to arms

trade problems emerged soon after. 70

Similarly, the Br.i ti sh continued to

stress their preference for regional

approaches, and only as a seeming

afterthought announced in 1979 that, "We have also followed with interest the
talks between the United States and the Soviet Union (which between them have
over 70 pecent of the world's arms trade)

on limiting the transfer of

conventional weapons. "71 The Germans had not yet changed their arms export
guidelines,

and maintained the image of a relatively NATO-oriented arms

marketeer, despite the reality of considerable and increasing Third World
indirect sales.
Implied in the British statement is a hint of second-tier suppliers'
basic objection to the CAT process at that time.

They perceived themselves in

a profoundly disadvantageous position in the international anns trade, and in
relation to weapons technology and autonomy.

In Europe, CAT restrictions

appeared to imply a freeze on the status-quo, which had the US and USSR
dominant in the field of high technology weaponry and its trade.
European defense

budgets were

tightly constrained,

and

West

the prospect of

increased subsidization of arms production, increased domestic procurement, or
increased unit costs did not excite planners.72
If joint Western approaches are to be taken seriously and to work, they
will require prior consulation and harmonization both of Western political and
security policies regarding the Third World and of trade policy.

Long
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deferred hard bargaining on the apportionment of Third World and NATO arms
markets would be required.
street"

This would probably entail a broader

in US weapons purchases and sales within the alliance,

11

two-way
and US

wi 11 i ngnes-s to restrict arms production capacity--perhaps on the model of
farm-land "set asides --or compensate smaller European suppliers in other
11

ways, as in the purchase of civilian high technology products.74
European Approaches
On

the

European

side,

coordination is detectable.

a nascent movement

toward

precedent for

policy

In 1983, this came to include calls for common

European Community arms procurement and transfer policies.
embargoes of Argentina

security

and Israel

during

Joint EC arms

their 1982 war constituted a

such coordination, although admittedly only on matters of

primary concern to at least one key Community member.75
Stirrings of European interest in joint security policies and weapons
procurement became evident in 1978, with a Western European Union (the
organization with responsibility in defense matters) study claiming that the
West European alliance arms market could be economical even without Thi rd
World exports.

Joint weapons procurement proved difficult, however, because

only four states produced most of Europe's weapons, and because national
governments had varying force preferences.

Article 23 of the Rome Treaty also

all owed EC states to protect their security information and their domestic
arms

industries

and

trade.

Further

obstacles

were

encountered

in

co-production projects, over competition for project leadership and difficulty
in translating experience in one type of arms production to anothe r.76
A series of European Parliament resolutions followed from 1978-84, on
coordinated security, conventional arms and industrial policies.77 Yet while
these were · adopted at Strasbourg, the heated debate indicated a lack of
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.

consensus both within and among European countries, and there has been little
subsequent imp 1ementation.

Among the issues in contention were where any

coordinated deci s i on-r:iak i ng s !1oul ct take pl ace ( WEU vs. European Parliament vs.
NATO vs. EC Council), and whether defense policy could be discussed in EC
contexts.

Arguments in favor of greater coordination of defense exports,

coming especially from certain British, German, and Danish conservatives,
stressed the need to avoid Euro-arms trade fiascos such as the Falkland and
Gulf wars, and the untapped po ten ti al of the European as opposed to Thi rd
World anns market.
The Conservative majority could fal 1 back on the EC Commission's strong
support of cross-boundary defense industry coordination; by 1983 technocrats
were

citing

the

need

for

Europe

to

emerge

as

more

competitive

in

high-technology fields to replace the dwindling coal and steel industries and
to avoid over-dependence on the US.

An expanded and coordinated Euro-anns

industry would fit the EC tradition of reduced protectionism, and could be
labelled conveniently as
defense issue.

"industrial"

or "security"

policy to avoid the

On the specific question of anns exports, the Commission

tended to hold back, however, since it entailed the controverial "sphere of
political cooperation."78 The Conservatives thought it unrealistic to propose
no EC anns sales to the Third World, · and opted instead for guidelines to
promote "stability" and avoid harm to member states' political and economic
interests.

The EC could not presume to decide the security needs of the Third

World, but certain types of equipment and technologies would be dangerous to
export.79
Although they initially had opposed discussion of such issues in the EC,
many Socialists eventually joined in proposing, if not ultimately voting for
the resolutions.

Their concerns were somewhat similar to the Conservatives,
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but went

further

as

they

argued

for

specific

export rules

and

bans.

Socialists worried that a coordinated European defense industry merely would
e~large the Euro-military-industrial complex and result in an increased push
for both NATO and Third World sales.

They reasoned that restrictions on the

West German mode 1 should be ex tended throughout Europe, perhaps in an arms
export convention, to ban sales to the Third World, to confine exceptions to
demonstrable common European foreign and security policy interests, with
safeguards against arms delivery to governments violating human rights, and
end-use cl ause enforcement and prohibitions of barter deals.

Thi rd World

development issues would be addressed, and the US and Soviets could be drawn
into common arms export limits.

Thus, the Socialist bloc noped not simply to

manage but to lower Europe's exports to the Third World.
restrictive

proposals

and

amendments

were

defeated,

Most of their

however,

and

most

Socialists could not support the final resolutions.SO
Euro-Communists

and

particular

variety of countries opposed

the

national
resolutions

political

groupings

as well.

from

a

While generally

denouncing the arms trade, Communists did not want the EC dragged toward
NATO-like defense debates and doctrines.

There could be no joint approach to

arms sales without agreement on a joint EC foreign
prospect in the near term.

policy, an unlikely

Both leftist and rightist representives of smaller

countries, and particularly many from Denmark, opposed moves toward greater EC
•

security coordination as risking British, French, and German domination.

The

Danes had opposed the Euro-arms embargo against Argentina during the Falklands
war as involving Denmark in that dispute, but by 1984 some Danish Socialists
were willing to support establishment of a Euro-parliamentary committee on
political aspects of security ·policy.Bl

Dutch MEPs argued in 1983 that a

joint arms export approach could link Europe to France in sales to the likes
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of Iraq.

Greeks worried about a US "trojan horse" in defense co-production

with British, French or German firms, and objected to 1ack of requ·irements for
anns transfer reports to the Euro-Parliament.
Perhaps most tel 1 i ngly, French Socialists opposed joint EC anns export
restrictions as conflicting with French sovereignty.
industrial

policies

and

joint

projects

to

While favoring common

stimulate

Europe's

high-tech

industries (presumably with French leadership}, it was argued that the WEU was
the only organ competent in defense matters:
11

••• a
common industrial policy in the anns field is diametrically
opposed to the principle of French national independence.
Anns
strategy is central to the planning, organization, and deployment of
France's entire military apparatus.
This is not an industrial
question, it is a question of defense."

The Socialist government of France had supported the defense of Europe, but
not necessarily a European defense, which could exist only with a single
political authority.

France viewed her European allies, with the exception of

Britain, as sinking since World War II into "military dependence, national
egoism, debilitation, and even destabilization and neutralism. 11 82

Thus the

requisite common outlook was lacking for a Euro-defense policy.
The fractured nature of the defense debate has been evident within as
well as among major EC countries and particularly within Britain and the FRG.
Anti-and pro-NATO factions, anti-and pro-nuclear factions, anti- and pro-anns
industry and sales factions vie for public support and votes.

Even for those

contemplating joint European approaches, larger and divisive EC projects come
first, such as common agricultural, budgetary and monetary policies.
The question al so remains as to what degree and at what point it is
possible or desirable to merge European initiatives in controlling the anns
trade with those of the superpowers and consumer states.
parties wait until

Must interested

the international climate for renewing CAT processes is

35

more auspicious, or can the processes be speeded with a greater sense of
urgency as reflected in the Palme Commission Report of 1982 and in calls for a
NATO

arms

suppliers
"equitable"

trade coordinating
to

establish

basis, with

committee?83

criteria

for

regulating

restraints defined

qualities, geography and circumstances."

The Palme Report urged arms

in

anns

transfers

on

an

terms of "quantities and

As we have seen, various interests

would define "equitable" differently, but the Report provides certain "guiding
principles" which might or might not clarify matters:
--"No significant increase in the quantity of weapons which are
transferred to a region.
-- "No first introduction of advanced weapon systems into a region
which create new or significantly higher levels of combat
capability.
--"Special restrictions on the transfer of lethal weapons to warring
parties~ taking into account the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence.
--"Adherence to · the implementation of United Nations resolutions and
sanctions.
--"No transfer of particularly inhumane and indiscriminate weapons.
--"Special precautions to be taken when transferring weapons, such as
hand-held anti-aircraft weapons, which if they fall into the hands
of i ndi vi duals or sub-national groups, would be especially
dangerous."
The Report went on to support resumption and expansion of the CAT talks to
include all major arms suppliers and to result in supplier-recipient ·talks in
regions of tension.

Regional security agreements and "zones of peace" could

be developed, with principles of restraint to be respected by supplying
states .84
Apart from 1i ngering ambi gui ti es on such questions as "1 egi ti mate right
of self-defense," "warring parties" and "significant increases," there remains
uncertainty about the advisability of European restraints in the absence of
superpower agreement.

Some would argue that European arms represent an

important

to

alternative

superpower

arms

exports

and

the

resultant

dependencies and temptations for superpower intervention in the Third World.
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Furthermore, a system. parcelling out markets could work to the disadvantage of
Third World arms purchasers by worsening the terms on offer in what has become
a buyers I market.

A tax on the arms trade, which al so has been proposed in UN

organs, might have similar effects, but also could diminish the oversupply of
weapons.
Is there likely, then, to be more multilateral arms export control in the
EC or NATO?

Incrementally, yes, but not in a Euro-arms export _convention at

least in the short term.

European parliamentarians, from the left, center and

right gradually have . come to favor at least some. degree of joint control over
arms exports. However the EP has little or no power to compel respective
governments

or

the

EC

Council

to

adopt

such

measures.

In

ca-ses of

co-production (e.g., the Tornado fighter and its mild provision for final
destination clauses in sales contracts), where crises similar to the Falklands
or Lebanon arise, as embarrassments such as those in the Gulf war and
shipments to repressive regimes multiply, and as concerns about terrorism and
inappropriate

release

of high

technology weapons mount,

there will

increased pressur·e for joint supplier coordination and restraints.

be

Indeed

there has been some informal convergence of separate British, German, and
French principles governing the arms trade.

However, common NATO rules are

likely to develop only if accompanied by greater US willingness to purchase
European arms or restrict America 1 s own arms sales.

And it is not clear to

w~at extent France would participate in or attempt to impede either European
or NATO coordination in this field.

CONCLUSIONS
The leading second-tier arms suppliers limit their exports unilaterally
to the extent of -some concern about the release of sensitive technologies, and
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•

to a lesser degree about the reliability of recipients (for example regarding
support of terrorism) and the degree of domestic repression· in the recipient
state.

While the British, French and Federal German governments all ment,on a

determination not to send arms or "war weapons" to areas of on-going warfare,
the reality belies such restictions especially in the French and British
cases,

and

particularly

in

the

Middle

Regarding

East.

technology

restrictions, the Germans appear particularly sensitive about armored fighting
vehicles, and especially main battle tanks.

The British watch carefully for

equipment of use to the USSR or terrorists, and pay some attention to domestic
control potential.

The French show concern about technology transfers, but

orient much of their weapon designs to export.
technological
equipment.

For all

three governments

restrictions appear particularly lax in the export of naval
The Germans and French

are

relatively

free with licenses

to

produce equipment abroad as well.
Prospects for increased restrictiveness in all such transfers depend upon
several

basic

developments

in

the

international

arms

markets

and

in

international politics: (1) the resiliency of Third World regional markets;
(2)

the political

procurement;

(3)

future of NATO and decisions about the alliance's arms
superpower arms control

initiatives

and

agreements;

(4)

European security policy developments; and (5) internal political debates in
Europe about the benefits of military production.
Second-tier suppliers increasingly will be confronted by the choice of

•

concentrating

on

sophisticated

weapons

systems

primarily

for

the

NATO

market--with excess exports to wealthier or militarily ambitious Third World
states--or moving toward the export of relatively simple designs, with few
export restrictions, to a broad Third World market.
would contend with significant competition

In either case, Europe

from other ·exporters:

The choice
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will

depend partly on the buoyancy of the Third World market.

But more

fundamentally, it will depend on second-tier states' determination to stay in
the weapons technology race.
advanced naval

If the ability to produce aerospace systems,

systems, advanced electronic guidance, and advanced fighting

vehicles remains a high priority and ·a symbol of national sovereignty, then
second-tier suppliers will have to come to tenns with the American challenge
and will look to market relatively higher priced products.
Yet there are signs that Britain, France, and the FRG cannot stay in such
a production league much longer on the basis of mainly national

efforts.

Naval and helicopter production are kept alive only with intense government
subsidy, with the most successful
designs (submarines and fast patrol

naval

marketing in Third World oriented

boats).

Mary Kal dor' s con ten ti on that

much of today's "sophisticated" weaponry is a "Baroque arsenal" could become
an

unavoidable

European

realization.85

US

and

Japanese

leadership

in

micro-chip and laser technology will complicate selection of a distinctively
European defense product mix

if traditional

w_e apon systems are abandoned.

Much wi 11 depend on the state of unemployment in Western Europe in the next
decade, and available government defense budgets and R and D allocations in
both defense and civilian sectors.
Government policy in this regard also will depend in turn on the future
of NATO, and Europe's security role.
issues

as

nuclear

governments will be

policy

or

If the alliance disintegrates, over such

distrust

of

American

leadership,

European

forced to spend more on conventional weaponry, and will

experience an expanded Euro-defense market.

Temporarily, at 1 east, they might

turn away from Third World markets, though interest in longer production runs
eventually would bring them back to such markets just as it did for the
Americans.

If NATO is maintained, but with a decision

to strengthen the
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"European pillar, 11 as appears increasingly to be an American preference, then
many of the same tendencies would apply.

However,

if Washington were to

provide the inducement of a more open "two-way street" in anns acquisition, or
to restrict its own defense marketing, and if France were drawn back into the
NATO market, the need for Third World sales would shrink considerably.

It is

here that the best prospects for a Western arms transfer regime would emerge,
with market sharing, mutual compensation, and eventual consultation with the
USSR and Third World customers.86

If, on the other hand, NATO continues as

is,

intra-alliance arms trade and unresolved

with

American

domination

of

British, French and West Gennan security and technology ambitions, then the
Third World market will remain Europe's release valve.
Prospects for a greater European security role, of course, depend upon
ironing out the differences, apparent in the European Parliament, the EC and
WEU, over foreign and defense policy.

A consensus that arms sales need to be

more car.efully controlled is emerging,
smaller state representatives.

at least among British, Gennan and

Conceivably, there could be an iron-clad rule

against anns exports or resupply to states or factions engaged in military
combat, unless compelling European security interests could be demonstrated to
the

Council

of

Ministers.87

But French

and

Communist

arguments

that

a

coordinated European foreign policy is~ prerequisite make considerable sense
as well.

Meanwhile, weapons of a particularly inhumane nature, or which would

be especially useful

to non-governmental

groups, might be restricted from

trade on the model of informal COCOM agreements on trade to the East bloc.
Such rudimentary multilateral anns control steps could provide the precedent
needed to encourage further development of an anns transfer regime.
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